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1 March 2020 
 
Additional evidence to Senate Standing Committees on Environment and Communications:   
Press Freedom Inquiry 
 
 
Summary 
1. This additional evidence is provided in following up some of the oral evidence on 10 Feb 2020 
and specifically in relation to a question from SENATOR GREEN.    
 
2. It has been submitted by Dr Lawrence McNamara (Reader, York Law School, University of 
York, UK), who gave oral evidence on 10 Feb 2020.  The author bio is in the original written 
evidence submitted 10 February 2020.  
 
3. It argues that the provisions for reporting to Parliament fall a very long way below that which is 
appropriate in a modern liberal democracy committed to the rule of law 
 
4. It makes recommendations about how provisions requiring reporting to Parliament might be 
amended to make reporting more effective with regard to transparency and oversight.     
 
__________________________________________ 
 
Reporting requirements under the Telecommunications (Interception and Access Act) 1979 
5. Section 186 sets out the matters on which the Minister must report annually to Parliament. 
These are, in effect: 
x The number of Journalist Information Warrants (JIWs) issued across the year  
x The number of authorisations made under those warrants   
 
As the 2018-19 annual report indicates at page 72, these are reported in total numbers.1 No 
further information is required to be provided nor has it been provided.  
 
                                                          
1
 Dept of Home Affairs, TIA Annual Report, 2018-19 (link), p 72. 
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6. These provisions are welcome inclusions in the Act but the provisions and the regime in which 
they sit mean that the transparency levels fall a very long way below that which is appropriate in 
a modern liberal democracy committed to the rule of law. The extent of secrecy associated with 
the JIW regime is extreme by comparable UK standards and practices.   
 
The importance of reporting to Parliament    
 
7. A fundamental role of Parliament is to hold the Executive to account. This is a constitutional 
mainstay. It is vital in a modern democracy that the Parliament has information that is 
necessary for that function to be carried out effectively.  Where the Executive seeks to act in 
ways that may have adverse effects on public access to information about the actions of the 
government and its agencies then the Parliament should be particularly vigilant.  Accordingly, 
when there is a risk of such adverse effects upon media access and reporting of information in 
the public interest then Parliament should set accountability requirements that minimise that 
risk.  This is because the media and journalists are often ³the eyes and ears of the public´. That 
observation has been made in the context of reporters in court2 but it applies equally in the 
parliamentary and executive context.3   
 
8. An Executive that resists transparency and a Parliament that is reluctant to demand it, 
especially where there are limits on what information emerges about court proceedings, run the 
risk of undermining public confidence in the key institutions of a democracy. 
 
9. There are, of course, limits to what can and should be made public, especially in the national 
security sphere.  However, the default position should be that information is made public unless 
the particular circumstances in any given situation require that information be withheld.  An 
appropriate test for that would be, for example, whether, based on the evidence, disclosure 
³ZRXOGEHGDPDJLQJWRWKHLQWHUHVWVRIQDWLRQDOVHFXULW\´4  
 
 
The approach in the TIA  
10. The position in the TIA is at odds with the standards and approach set out above.  The TIA 
takes a blanket approach to maintaining secrecy.  Even if there were administrative reasons for 
this at the time a JIW is sought, the disclosure of information at the reporting stage should be 
far less problematic, especially when investigations have been concluded or a warrant 
executed.   
 
11. Five examples may be taken of the provisions that illustrate the blanket approach to secrecy 
and the absence of reporting information that will enable Parliament to carry out its function of 
holding the Executive to account: 
 
x First, section 182A imposes blanket and extensive restrictions on disclosure of the 
existence of a JIW or even the fact that one has been applied for.  This applies 
                                                          
2
 Eg, Lord Bingham in Turkington v Times Newspapers Limited (Northern Ireland) [2000] [UKHL 57 [4] 
3
 Eg, UK Joint Committee on Human Rights, The Justice and Security Green Paper, 24th Report of 
session 2010-2012, chapter 6 (link)  
4
 This phrase is drawn from the UK Justice and Security Act 2013, s 6(11). 
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regardless of whether there is any evidence that disclosure would pose a risk to an 
investigation or to national security.5 
 
x Second, section 186(4) states that reports to Parliament ³must not be made in a 
PDQQHUWKDWLVOLNHO\WRHQDEOHWKHLGHQWLILFDWLRQRIDSHUVRQ´  Again, this applies 
regardless of whether identification would pose any risk of any kind.  But very 
significantly, it seems also to prevent the issuing authority being identified.  Section 
SURYLGHVWKDW³The report may contain any other information the Minister 
FRQVLGHUVDSSURSULDWH´EXWLWZRXOGVHHPWKDWWKHH[SUHVVZRUGLQJRIVZRXOG
prevent identification.  
 
x Third, following on from the second point, there is no requirement that the issuing 
authority be identified.  This is extraordinary because the courts are a key safeguard 
and yet their participation in the process is hidden from view at every stage, including 
after the fact.   
 
x Fourth, while there is some transparency around how many warrants have been issued, 
there is no requirement for reporting on the number and frequency of applications fro 
warrants.  Again, given the restrictions on the visibility of proceedings and that warrants 
can be sought exp parte and without notice to the media, and that it seems a person 
subject to a warrant cannot disclose its existence (due to s 182A), there is no way for 
Parliament to judge the extent to which the Executive seeks to exercise its reach, nor 
any way to judge how the courts might be managing that reach.   
 
x Fifth, there are provisions in the Act for a Public Interest Advocate to make 
representations in the absence of notice to the media.  However, there is no 
requirement for reporting on how often Public Interest Advocates have been engaged.   
 
12. In the UK the system for obtaining warrants in relation to journalistic material is very different. 
However, in the UK there are two useful parallels that provide examples of transparency that 
far exceed those associated with the TIA: 
x Reporting to Parliament under section 12 of the Justice and Security Act 2013 (JSA), 
and 
x Reporting on investigation errors by the Investigatory Powers Commissioner (IPC).    
   
13. The JSA provides for the use of Closed Material Procedures in civil proceedings, under which 
non-state parties will not see all the evidence that the state relies on.  Section 12 requires the 
executive to report on a range of matters associated with their use, including the number of 
applications the Executive has made for use of CMPs.  Section 12 also has a provision that 
DOORZVIRULQFOXVLRQRIPDWHULDOEH\RQGPHUHQXPEHUVRIPDWWHUV³WKHUHSRUWPD\DOVRLQFOXGH
such other matters as the Secretary of State considers apprRSULDWH´6 The reports by the 
Secretary of State began with the mere provision of numbers but since the second annual 
report have provided information about the specific cases in question.7  Time has shown that 
                                                          
5
 The recommendations below focus on reporting to Parliament and do not address whether this provision is 
justifiable. However, while making stronger requirements for reporting to Parliament is important, improving 
reporting will not resolve all the concerns that s 182A gives rise to. 
6
 Justice and Security Act 2013, s 12(3) (link) 
7
 6HHµ8VHRIFORVHGPDWHULDOSURFHGXUHUHSRUWV¶ZKLFKFRQWDLQVDOODQQXDOUHSRUWVWRGDWH
https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/use-of-closed-material-procedure-reports.  
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it would be more appropriate to have a mandatory requirement for disclosure of specific 
information (unless a risk would result), but the discretionary provision in the UK is at least 
some safeguard.8 
 
14. The IPC is a sitting or retired senior judge.  The IPC report on the exercise of investigatory 
powers provides another example of where detail about specific matters can be provided.  For 
each of the errors in the use of investigatory powers the IPC provides a description of 100-200 
words of the issue and error in question and identifies the type of authority, the cause of the 
error and the consequence.9 It is an example of how information can be provided without any 
risk to national security. 
 
15. The sum position should be that where information can be made public without risk then it 
should be made public.  The onus should fall on the state to establish, before a judicial or 
other independent authority, that disclosure would carry a risk. 
 
Recommendations 
16. Recommendation 1: 7KH0LQLVWHU¶VUHSRUWVKRXOGLGHQWLI\WKHcircumstances and 
individuals concerned where a warrant was issued. This should only be omitted where 
the Minister can establish to the satisfaction of a judicial officer or other suitable 
independent person that such identification would pose a risk. 
 
17. Recommendation 27KH0LQLVWHU¶VUHSRUWVKRXOGVWDWHWKHQXPEHURIRFFDVLRQVRQ
which a JIW was sought from an issuing authority. 
 
18. Recommendation 37KH0LQLVWHU¶VUHSRUWVKRXOGVWDWHWKHQXPEHURIRFFDVLRQVRQ
which Public Interest Advocates have been engaged, and for how many warrants.  
 
19. Recommendation 4: 7KH0LQLVWHU¶VUHSRUWVKRXOGLGHQWLI\WKHLVVXLQJDXWKRULW\IRUHDFK
warrant and whether the warrant was issued or refused at first instance, and whether it 
was issued or refused on a revised application. 
 
 
Draft provisions to give effect to the recommendations 
20. Provision to give effect to Recommendations 1-4: 
 
The complexity of the TIA means that the following recommendations would best be given 
effect by a legislative drafter familiar with the structure and content of the Act.  However, the 
following is an indicative draft. 
 
The present Section 186(4) should be repealed and replaced with the following: 
 
Section 186(4)(a):  A report under this section should describe circumstances where 
each warrant was issued, including but not limited to: 
(i) the identification of individuals and organisations that were the subject of 
warrants,  
(ii) the identification of the issuing authority 
                                                          
8
 See L McNamara & D Lock, Closed Material Procedures under the Justice and Security Act 2013: A Review of 
the First Report by the Secretary of State, Bingham Centre for the Rule of Law, 2014 (link) 
9
 /ŶǀĞƐƚŝŐĂƚŽƌǇWŽǁĞƌƐŽŵŵŝƐƐŝŽŶĞƌ ?ƐKĨĨŝĐĞ ?/WK ?Annual Report 2017, p 114-127 (link). 
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(iii) whether a Public Interest Advocate was engaged 
(iv) the identification of any record of associated proceedings of the issuing 
authority  
 
Section 186(4)(b):  Identification requirements of paragraph (a) will not apply where the 
Minister has established to the satisfaction of a judicial officer or suitable independent 
person that identification would prejudice an ongoing investigation or would be likely to 
damage national security. 
Section 184(4)(c): A report under this section must state the number of occasions on 
which a Journalist Information Warrant was sought from an issuing authority. 
Section 184(4)(d): A report under this section must state the number of occasions on 
which a Public Interest Advocate was engaged when a Journalist Information Warrant 
was sought from an issuing authority. 
Section 184(4)(e): A report under this section must state the issuing authority for 
warrants and the number of times that each issuing authority: 
(i) issued a warrant in the first instance 
(ii) refused to issue a warrant in the first instance 
(iii) issued a warrant on a revised application 
 
 
21. I hope the above comments and recommendations are helpful to the Committee in its Inquiry.  
 
 
Dr Lawrence McNamara 
University of York, 1 March 2020  
